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Over the last 20 to 30 years  government  spending.as  a share  of
GDP has grown  worldwide. But in comparing  developing  and
developed  nations,  the  current  levels,  growth  rates,  composition,
and determinants  of government  expenditures  exhibit signifi-
cant differences.
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The growth of government in the developing  *  Transfer payments in developing nations
economies is compared with the experience of  are still at low levels when compared with ad-
the industrial countries.  Relying on measures of  vanced economies but appear to be growing
government expenditure as proxies for govem-  quickly. Government consumption expenditures
ment size the following is observed:  tend to be growing faster than GDP.
* In the developing nations, central govern-  *  Available data make it difficult to draw firm
ment expenditures as a share of GNP range from  conclusions about what increases in government
10.8 percetit to 62.1 percent and exhibit greater  input costs versus increases in the level of pu9bic
variance than is found in the industr;al countries.  output c -ntribute to the growth in public spend-
ing.
. Developing economies, especially the low-
income nations, devote, on average, smaller  Numerous arguments can be raised to
percentages of GDP to government spending  explain why the size of government relative to
than do OECD countries.  But compared with  GDP has grown in most developing nations.
the historical experience of the industrial na-  Demographic factors, preferences for public
tions, low and middle income nations already  provision of goods and services, and increasing
consume much higher fractions of GDP.  unit costs of government production are all
likely to have been influential.  Development
* For the last 20 to 30 years, expansion in the  theorizing itself as well as the "demonstration
share of government spending as a percentage of  effect" of advanced capitalist and socialist
GDP appears to have been the norm in both  economies may also have played a role.
developing and developed countries.
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Of  the  many  distinguishing  features  of  economies  in  the  twentieth  century,
one  pronounced  trend  has  been  for  governments  to  spend  ever  larger  proportions
of  national  income.  This  result  appears  to  hold  across  most  countries
regardless  of  the  level  of  economic  development.  But  what  begins  as  a simple
empirical  observation  about  the  growth  of  government,  quickly  gives  rise  to  a
wealth  of  controversies  which  range  from  technical  debates  over  measurement
and  definition,  to  ideological  disputes  over  the  essential  role  of  government
in  an  economy.
In  this  paper  an  attempt  is  made  to  discuss  two  basic  issues  concerning
the  growth  of  government  especially  as  it  pertains  to  developing  economies:
(1) what  have  been  the  trends  in  the  growth  of  government  expenditures  in
developing  relative  to  industrialized  nations;  and,  (2) what  are  the
potential  explanations  for  the  observed  growth  in  spending  by  developing
country  governments.  The  paper  is  organized  as  follows.
Section  I  surveys  the  empirical  evidence  on  the  growth  of  government
expenditures.  First,  a  number  of  measurement  issues  are  raised,  including  the
definition  of  the  public  sector,  the  appearance  of  off-budget  expenditures,3
anfl  the  use  of price  deflators  for  government  output. Section  I then  reviews
available  data  on government  expenditures  for  OECD  and developing
nations. Both  a  long  term  perspective,  provided  by several  OECD economies,
and  contemporary  experience,  essentially  since  1960,  are  presented.
In Section  II,  the  determinants  of the  growth  in  government  are
considered.  This literature  covers  demographic  demands  for  expenditure
growth,  the  changing  relative  prices  of public  vis-a-vis  private  goods,  the
income  elasticity  of public  goods,  and  the  arguments  of the  gs  :  choice
school. Most  of these  explanations  have been  directed  at unde4.,  .1ding  trends
in industrialized  nations,  and  little  has been  written  on the  relevance  of
these  explanations  for  developing  nations. This section  briefly  speculates  on
the  determinancs  of government  growth  in  developing  countries  against  the
backdrop  provided  by results  on advanced  economics.
I.  Measuring  the  Growth  in  Government  Expenditures
A.  MEASUREMENT  ISSUES
1.  Defining  the  scope  of the  public  sector.
Depending  upon  the  specific  question  to be raised,  government  expenditures
may  or may  not  be a suitable  proxy  for  the  size  of government. Any  nominal
valuation  of government,  be it  an expenditure  or revenue  measure,  implicitly
assumes  that  government's  role  as a direct  economic  agent  is  what is to be
assessed. Government's  impact  as a regulator  of economic  activity,  through
such  macro  or micro  instruments  as  monetary  policy  or the  tariff  structure,
clearly  will  not  be captured  by a  nominal  index  which  defines  a government's
size  and influence  ex2lusively  in  budgetary  terms.14
The  size  of  government  as  a  direct  economic  agent  is,  however,  of  enough
interest  and  importance  to  recommend  consideration  of  the  extent  of  this  role.
While  expenditure  definitions  of  government,  most  frequently  the  ratio  of
government  spending  to  GDP,  are  commonly  used,  alternatives  to  expenditure
measuris  may  be  employed.  These  include  revenue  definitions  of  the  size  of
government,  such  as,  the  ratio  of  government  revenue  to  GDP  or  other  measures
of  tax  effort,  or  even  budget  deficit/surplus  estimates,  reflecting  the
difference  between  expenditures  and  revenues.  The  choice  of  measure  depends,
in  part,  on  the  question  being  raised.  The  impact  of  a  government's  fiscal
expansion  on  matters  of  economic  stabilization  would  appear  to  call  for  a
budget  deficit/surplus  measure.  But  to  get  at  such  issues  as  how  the  division
of  output  between  public  and  private  goods  (or  between  public  versus  private
provision  of  goods)  affects  economic  growth  requires  the  use  of  measures  of
total  government  spending.
For  the  remainder  of  this  paper,  an  expenditure  definition  of  government
size  is  employed.  Such  a  measure  is  in  keeping  with  established  conventions
in  the  literature  on  growth  in  government  and  is  relevant  to  the  discussion  of
Section  II  below. 2
2. The  measurement  of  goyernment  expenditures.
Proceeding  with  an  expenditure  definition,  the  next  step  is  to  specify  the
units  of  government  to  be  included.  Beyond  central  government  there  exist
state  and  locel  governments,  statutory  bodies  and  all  the  organizational  forms
commonly  referred  to  as  public  enterprises.  While  in  principle  any5
comprehensive  definition  of  government  should  include  all  these  entities,  in
practice,  central  government  expenditures  are  often  all  that  is  recorded  given
the  availability  and  reliability  of  expenditure  data.
While  measures  of  state  and  local  expenditures  are  often  simply
unavailable,  public  enterprises  pose  problems  that  go  beyond  the  problem  of
non-existent  data. Since  the  U.N.  System  of  National  Accounts  does  not  call
for  any  unique  t:eatment  of  public  enterprises  as  organs  of  government 3,
public  enterprise  information  rarely  finds  its  way  into  sources  concerned  with
quantifying  governmcnt  expenditures.  The  absence  of  data  on  public
enterprises  is  particularly  troubling,  especially  for  developing  nations,
where  the  growth  in  state  enterprises  is  believed  to  be  a  dominant  form  of
government  expansioni  in  the  past  10-20  years. 4
While  expenditure  data  on  state  and  local  governments  and  public
enterprises  may  generally  be  absent  from  standard  sources,  other  problems
confront  calculation  of  central  government  expenditures  as  a  measure  of  total
government  spending.  Often  omitt3d  are  off-budget  activities  including  tax
expenditures,  subsidies,  government  lending  and  government  loan  guarantees.
Tax  expenditures  refer  to  the  use  of  tax  concessiont  for  specific  groups  as  a
substitute  for  direct  expenditures.  The  attractiveness  of  these  fiscal
instruments  is  their  lack  of  transparency  and  overall  c-ntrolability;  however,
at  the  same  time  they  may  be  costly  as  they  impart  distortions  to  public
resource  mobilization  and  allocation.  Furthermore,  tax  expenditures  can
confound  both  cross-country  and  intertemporal  comparisons  of  the  size  and6
growth  of  government  especially  when  the  use  of  tax  expenditures  changes.  A
telling  example  of  .'his  pro'--  from  an  OECD  setting  follows:
Another  case  in  point  'L  government  child  support;  in
some  countries  (e.g.  Canada  and  the  United  States)  the
number  of  children  in  a  family  determines  the  size  of
tax  free  income  allowances,  thus  co-determining  total
tax  revenue  and  its  share  in  GDP. In  other  countries,
(e.g.  Germany  and  the  Netherlands)  the  Government  pays
cash  allowances  to  families  with  children,  while  a
family's  tax  bill  (and  thus  total  tax  revenue)  is  lar-
gely  unaffected  by  the  number  of  children.  Thus,  an
item  which  enters  the  accounts  as  direct  expenditure
in  the  latter  countries  is  treated  as  a  tax  expendi-
ture  in  the  former,  reducing  revenue  rather  than  add-
ing  to  expenditure.  Even  in  the  hypothetical  case
where  the  net  effects  on  family  disposable  income  and
tax  revenue  are  identical,  the  gross  figures  for  gov-
ernment  expenditure  and  revenue  differ  under  the  two
approaches  ...  and  are  thus  not  directly  comparable. 5
While  the  extent  of  off-budget  activity  is  not  well  quantified,  the  trend
in  OECD  nations  has  been  toward  increasing  use  of  these  alternatives  to  direct
expenditures.  The  same  may  be  true  for  developing  economies,  although  it  is
also  possible  that  on  balance  fiscal  reforms  have  led  to  direct  payments
replacing  implicit  subsidies.
3.  Should  one  deflate?
In  making  intertemporal  comparisons  of  government  expenditures  one  runs
into  familiar  index  number  problems.  One  method  of  avoiding  the.  problem  of
deflating  to  constant  dollars  is  to  compare  the  ratio  of  government
expenditures  to  GDP. An  argument  against  this  procedure  is  that  the  price  of
public  goods  may  tend  to  rise  more  quickly  relative  to  the  prices  of  all  other
goods,  i.e.,  private  consumption  and  investment  goods.  This  will  be  the  case7
if,  following  Baumol  (1967),  it  is  assumed  that  technological  change  is  faster
in  the  relatively  less  service-intensive  private  sector. 6 Under  such
assumptions  about  relative  price  changes  for  public  and  private  goods,
government  expenditure  ratios  based  on  current  prices  bias  upwards  the  trend
in  the  "quantity"  of  governLen*  output  since  relative  price  effects  are  not
accounted  for. An  opposing  position  argues  that  nominal  and  not  "real"  shares
of  government  expenditures  actually  are  what  is  important  as  long  as  relative
prices  of  public  and  private  goods  reflect  consumer  valuations. 7 If  this  is
the  case,  the  share  of  output  in  value  terms  is  the  appropriate  index  of
government's  claim  on  income.
Whether  nominal  or  real  shares  of  government  expenditures  should  be
employed  in  analyzing  t,ie  "size"  of  government  clearly  depends  on  the  question
being  raised.  Dctermination  of  the  income  elasticity  of  the  demand  for  public
goods  would  seem  to  require  a  real  measure  of  government  output.  However,
assessment  of  the  resource  requirements  of  government  would  favor  a  nominal
index.  Ultimately,  getting  a  handle  on  the  reasons  behind  the  increasing  (or
decreasing)  cost  of  government  would  benefit  from  a  comparison  of  both
measures.  In  any  event,  estimates  of  the  growth  in  government  expenditures
reveal  considerable  differences  depending  on  the  choice  of  a  constant  versus
current  dollars  measure.
4.  The  constraints  of  the  data.
For  OECD  nations  an  array  of  government  expenditure  data  are  available  and
have  been  reported  on. The  opposite  is  the  case  for  most  developing  nations.8
Before  surveying  existing  studies,  a few  dimensions  of the available  data  are
worth  noting.
The  two  major  sources  of government  expenditure  data  are  national  income
accounts  and  government  buidgets,  the former  being  more  widely  available  and
reported  on in discussions  of government  size in developing  countries.
Standardized  sources  for  national  income  accounts  for  developing  nations  tend
to provide  only  government  consumption  (Gc),  which  differs  from  total
government  expenditures  (Ge)  by  excluding  government  transfer  payments  (Gt)
and  government  gross  capital  formation  (Gi).  By comparison,  government  budget
data,  widely  available  for  OECD  nations,  tend  to cover  all  components  of Ge.
Measures  of Ge seem  most  appropriate  for  assessing  the  total  resource  cost  of
government  activity. By comparison,  Gc is  a more limited  index  of the
"resource  burden"  of government  but  may  be a more  precise  measure  of spending
for  public  goods,  per se.
One  of the  most standardized  and  comprehensive  sources  on Gc, in  terms
both  of number  of nations  and  years  of coverage,  has been  provided  by Summers
and  Heston(1984).  This data  set  has  been  widely  used  by R. Ram,  who  has
authored  a  number  of recent  empirical  papers  on the  growth  of government. 8
The  Summers  and  Heston  series  employs,  so-called,  'international  prices'  in
order  to reflect  truer  purchasing  power  parity  than is  available  by relying  on
official  market  exchange  rates. These  data  are,  therefore,  deflated  to a
particular  series  of constant  dollars. Given  the  differences  between  the
Summers  and  Heston  data  and  those  employed  by other  researchers  (i.e.,  most9
often  on  Ge  from  the  IMF's  Government  Finance  Statistics  Yearbook  (GFSY)),
care  must  be  taken  in  making  any  comparisons  across  studies.
B. OECD  EXPERIENCE
The  sizeable  increase  in  the  share  of  government  expenditure  out
national  income  is  a  relatively  recent  phenomenon  in  OECD  countries.  Data
for  the  United  States  illustrate  this  point  (Table  1). While  no  one  series
runs  from  1800  through  the  present,  the  general  trend  is  clear.  Federal
government  expenditures,  measured  in  current  dollars,  account  for  a  minimal
share  of  nationai  income  until  World  War  I. A significant  dip  characterizes
the  inter-war  period,  but  thereafter  the  ratio  of  U.S.  Government  expenditures
to  GNP  steadily  marches  on  rising  more  than  sevenfold  between  1929  and  1984.
Peacock  and  Wiseman(1961)  report  a  similar  overall  trend  for  the  United
Kingdom.10 In  fact,  the  same  historical  trend  applies  to  OECD  nations  as  a
group.  Employing  the  narrower  Gc  definition  of  government  spending,
Kuznets  (1966)  (Table  2)  shows  that  the  share  of  Gc  out  of  GNP  in  both  Europe
and  the  United  States  did  not  reach  double  digits  until  the  1940's,  and  often
not  until  the  1950's.
Extending  the  OECD  record  into  the  contemporary  period,  Saunders  and
Klau(1985)  employ  comprehensive  Ge  data  for  23  nations  (Table  3),  and  report
that  government  spending  has,  on  average,  increased  from  26.3%  to  47.0%  of  GNP
in  the  years  1960  to  1982. (Tanzi(1986)  provides  similar  information  but  for
more  years:  1960,  1971,  1975  and  1983.  (Table  4)) Saunders  and  Klau(1985)10
offer  some  further  understanding  of the  sources  of growth  in  government
expenditures  by  dividing  G. into  its  constituent  components:  Gc,  Gt  and  Gi.
The  elasticity  of  each  spending  category  with  respect  to  nominal  GDP  is
reporteu  and  provides  a suimmary  measure  of  the  growth  in  spending  (Table  5).
While  in  all  cases  both  Gc  and  Gt  exhibit  greater  than  unitary  elasticities,
in  most  all  cases  transfers  have  been  the  fastest  growing  element  in  OECD
expenditures.  By  comparison,  in  well  over  half  of  these  nations,  the
elasticity  of  public  investment  has  been  less  than  or  equal  to  one,  reflecting
a slowdown  in  the  rate  of  government  capital  formation.
To  better  appreciate  the  sources  of  growth  in  government  spending,  at
least  for  the  U.S.,  Musgrave(1981)  suggests  some  further  disaggregation  of
total  government  expenditures.  (Table  6  replicates  and  updates  Musgrave's
original  table.)  In  addition  to  the  growth  in  transfers,  Musgrave  highlights
the  variations  in  total  expenditure  growth  both  over  time  (i.e.,  high  in  the
fifties  and  low  in  the  seventies)  and  according  to  source  (i.e.  defense  versus
civilian;  federal  versus  state  and  local),  and  concludes,  "...it  appears  that
the  growth  of  Leviathan,  especially  in  the  recent  past,  is  in  the  eyes  of  the
beholder."li  Focusing  only  on  the  endpoints,  1940  to  1986,  total  U.S.
govsrnment  expenditure  shares  rose  by  16.9%.  Transfers  account  for  10.5%  of
this  increase.  What  remains  is  the  6.4%  increase  in  government  purchases
(Ge-Gt),  measured  in  current  prices.  By  comparison,  if  the  implicit  price
deflator  of  government  purchases  is  applied,  total  "real"  government  purchases
have  grown  by  less  than  one  percent  with  civilian  purchases  having  actually
declined  by  3.0%. By  implication,  the  increasing  relative  price  of  public11
goods  accounts  for  much  of  the  total  non-transfer  payment  increase  in  U.S.
public  expenditures. 12
In  summary,  the  OECD  data  suggest  the  following:
(1) Governmernt  spending  varies  considerably  across  OECD  nations.  In  1982
total  government  expenditure  shares  out  of  GDP  ranged  from  30.0%-67.3%.
(2) The  substantial  share  of  government  expenditures  out  of  national  income
is  a  relatively  recent  occurrence  dating,  in.  most  countries,  to  the  period
following  World  War  II;
(3) Transfer  payments  are  a  major  source  of  recent  increases  in  total
government  expenditures  while  government  investment  has  represented  a
declining  share.  Gc  ciasticities,  measured  in  current  prices,  also  are  above
1  in  all  OECD  nations,  and  thus  account  for  a  sha::e  if  the  growth  in  total
expenditures;
(4) While  government  expenditure  elasticities  with  respect  to  GDP  in  value
terms  are  greater  than  unity,  relative  price  increases  in  the  production  of
public  goods  may  indicate,  in  real  terms,  government  spending  elasticities  of
a different  magnitude.  In  the  U.S.  real  expenditure  elasticities  appear  close
to  or  below  unity  for  much  of  the  post-war  period.
C.  DEVELOPING  NATION  EXPERIENCE
Information  on  the  size  and  growth  of  government  expenditures  in
developing  economies  is  far  less  available  than  it  is  for  OECD  countries.  The12
long  term  perspective  presented  by  Kuznets  and  others  on  Europe  and  the  U.S.
cannot  be  replicated  for  the  nations  of  Africa,  Asia  and  Latin  America.  Even
the  contemporary  picture  is  difficult  to  piece  together.
Since  1984,  the  World  bank's,  World  Development  Report  (WDR),  lists  both
central  Ge  as  a  percentage  of  GNP  (WDR.  1987,  Table  23)  and  Gc  as  a  share  of
GDP  (WDR,  1987,  Table  5). The  first  series,  drawn  from  the  GFSY,  excludes
state,  provincial  and  local  government  expenditures.  The  notes  to  the  various
tables  contained  in  these  sources  all  urge  caution  in  making  cross-country
comparisons  based  on  the  data. Nonetheless,  some  basic  trends  are  suggested.
Of  the  96  low  and  middle  income  economies  listed  in  the  1987  WDR,  39  (74)
provide  government  expenditure  (consumption)  data  for  both  years  considered:
1972  (1965)  and  1985. In  this  sample,  the  developing  economies,  as  a  group,
possess  smaller  government  spending  shares  than  do  the  industrialized  market
economies  (Table  7). But  it  is  also  evident  that  the  proportion  of  government
spending  in  developing  economies  bears  little  resemblance  to  the  historical
experience  of  the  now  industrialized  nations.  Using  a  narrower  definition  of
government  spending,  the  share  of  Gc  out  of  GDP  in  1985  for  developing
nations,  generally,  is  already  in  double  digits  (82%  of  cases).  As  noted
above,  this  level  was  not  reached  by  most  advanced  economies  until  the  1940's
and  1950's  (Table  2),  when  per  capita  income  levels  were  already  multiples  of
those  of  today's  low  and  middle  income  nations.  It,  therefore,  appears  safe
to  conclude  that  if  there  is  a "pattern  of  development"  for  government
consumption,  it  is  not  particularly  robust.1313
Returning  to Table  7 and  looking  across  countries,  a positive  relationship
between  per  capita  income  level  and  government  consumption  and  expenditure
shares,  a generalized  relationship  often  referred  to as  Wagner's  "Law" 14.  s
somewhat  in  evidence. In 1985,  the  value  of  median  expenditure  shares
steadily  increases  across  the  four  groupings  of nations  ranked  from  low-income
to industrialized  market  economies. However,  within  any  one  group  of
countries,  the  range  of both  expenditure  and consumption  shares  is  broad
enough  so  that  a considerable  overlap  is  present  across  all  income  groups.
A positive  relationship  between  ince-ne  level  and  government  spending  is
also  suggested  by the  movement  in individual  Ge (Gc)  ratios  over  time.  Ge
(Gc)  shares  increase  from  1972  (1965)  to 1985  in 72% (69%)  of the  countries
for  which  data  are  presented. However,  sufficient  numbers  of cases  are
exceptions  to this  trend  reflecting  either:  (a)  serious  misrepresentations  in
the  data;  (b)  significant  shifts  in  national  political  orientation;  or,  (c)
counter-examples  to  Wagner's  "Law". Caution  again  appears  warranted  in
positing  any  unique  relationship  between  government  spending  shares  and  per
capita  income  level.
Beyond  the  WDR data,  an examination  of government  expenditure  trends  in
developing  economies  has been  undertaken  by Pluta(1981). Relying  on fiscal
data  taken  from  the DiF's,  International  Financial  Statistics  (IFS),  Pluta
measures  the  growth  in  government  expenditures  for  20 non-African  developing
countries  from,  roughly,  the  early  1960's  to the  mid-1970's. IFS  data rely  on
a country's  own  definition  of government  expenditures  and  are less  comparable
across  countries  than  data obtained  from  the  GFSY.  Although  Pluta  does  not14
raise  the issue,  non-central  government  expenditures  are  probably  omitted  from
IFS  data  just  as they  are in the  WDR central  government  expenditure  figures.
With  these  qualifications  in  mind,  consider  Pluta's  results  (Table  8).  He
finds  a median  value  in the  mid-1970's  for  Ge as a share  of GDP  of 17.4%.
This is  below  half  the  median  value  of 43.2%  reported  by  Tanzi(1986)  (Table  4)
for  OECD economies  in 1975. Furthermore,  by the  mid-1970's  only  two  out  of
the  twenty  countries  in  Pluta's  sample,  Cyprus  (27.8%)  and Sri  Lanka  (30.0%),
have  Ge shares  greater  than  the  lowest  value  reported  for  any  OECD country  in
1975,  Spain  (24.7%). Even  if state  and  local  government  expenditures  were
added  to the  developing  country  data,  it is unlikely  that  the  reported
differences  with  OECD  nations  would  change  substantially.
Pluta  also  presents  a decomposition  of E-e  suggesting  some  further
differences  between  OECD  and  developing  economies. Not surprisingly,  transfer
payments  are  a much  smaller  percentage  of developing  nation  government
outlays. In Pluta's  sample  the  ratio,  Gt/GDP,  has  a median  value  of 6.3% in
the  mid-1970's  as compared  to a  mean  value  of 24.3%  in  OECD  countries  in 1982.
The  results  suggest  that the  level  and composition  of government  expenditures
for  developing  economies  differ  substantially  from  those  of industrialized
economies.
When considering  growth  in  government  expenditures,  a somewhat  different
result  is  obtained. Pluta  estimates  the  elasticity  of Ge,  as well  as of Gc
and  Gt,  with respect  to  GDP in both  current  and  constant  prices  for  each
nation  (Table  9).  The  elasticities  based  on current  prices  can  be compared15
with  those  obtained  by  Saunders  and  Klau(1985)  for  OECD  countries  (Table  5),
although  differences  exist  between  the  two  studies.  15 The  developing  nation
median  elasticity  for  Ge  is  1.25  and  is  remarkably  close  to  the  OECD  median
elasticity  of  1.20. Median  values  for  Gc  are  even  closer  while  for  Gt  they
are  further  apart.1 6 (Pluta  offers  no  discussion  of  Gi.)
Relatively  similar  experience  in  the  growth  of  government  expenditures
across  countries  is  suggested  by  these  statistics.  However,  the  range  in  the
individual  elasticity  estimates  for  the  group  of  developing  economies  is
large,  0.83  - 2.54.  In  contrast,  the  OECD  values  range  from  only 1.07  - 1.37.
There,  therefore,  may be  far  less  in  common  about  the  recent  growth  in
government  spending  across  these  two  groups  of  countries  than  might  have  at
first  appeared.
Another  study,  Ram(1987),  shares  this  view  noting:
The main  conclusion  is  that  there  is  much diversity  in  the
character  of  the  covariance  between  income  and  government
expenditure  in  different  countries.  Therefore,  it  is  difficult
to  make  a  universally  valid  statement  and  one  can  get  a  result
of  almost  any  kind  ... 17
Ram's  conclusion  is  drawn from  what must  be  the  most  extensive  study  of
government  consumption  growth  yet  undertaken.  He  employs  the  data,  described
above  on  Gc  in  constant  international  prices  generated  by  Summers and
Heston(1984).  Ram has  20-30  years  of  annual  observations  available  per  nation
and  estimates  for  each of  115  nations  two  related  elasticities:  (I)  Gc with
respect  to  GDP;  and  (II)  (Gc/GDP)  with  respect  to  GDP  per  capita.  (The  latter16
is  often viewed  as a  better  test  of  Wagner's  "Law". 18)  Table  10  reproduces
Ram's  results.
According  to  these  data,  Wagner's  "Law" is  rejected  in  about 40%  of  the
cases,  i.e.,  elasticity  (I)  or  (II)  being  less  than  1  or  0,  respectively.  Ram
emphasizes  the large variance  in elasticity  estimates  and explains  this
outcome,  as  evidence  of  the  lack  of  any  "universality  or  inevitability"  in  the
trend  toward  government  expansion  within  nations.
But  such  a  conclusion  may  be a  bit hasty.  For  one, Ram's  data do  not
include  transfer  payments,  which seem to  be  growing  faster  than  any  other
component  of  total  Ge  and  would,  therefore,  increase  the  elasticity  estimates
in  most  cases.  19 Second,  some  bias  may  be  imposed  by  the  particular  constant
price  series  employed.  This  latter  point  is  an  issue beyond  that of  whether
real  or nominal  values of  government  spending  are  what  should  be  measured  in
assessing  the  growth  in  government  expenditures.
The  potential  measurement  problem  appears  as  follows.  Ram's  results
provide  elasticities  based  on constant  prices  for  OECD  countries  for  1960  to
1980  which  can  be  compared  with the  current  price  series  from  Saunders  and
Klau(1985)  covering  1960  to  1982. Ram's  OECD  elasticities  for  Gc  yield  8  out
of  21  values  below  1.00,  in  fact,  4  estimates  between  .51-.75.  In  comparison,
Saunders  and Klau's  23 elasticities  for Gc  based  on  current  prices  yield  no
value  less  than  1.07.  If, as has been argued,  the input prices  facing
government  increase  faster  than other  prices,  constant  price  elasticities  of
Gc  will  be  lower  than  the  value  based  on  current  prices. However,  the  degree17
to  which Ram's  results  appear  to  fall  below  those  of  Saunders  and  Klau  raise
questions  about  the  content  of  the implicit  price deflator  built into  the
Summers  and  Heston  data.
The  same problem,  of  course,  could  confront  the  developing  nations  in  the
sample.  In  fact,  t  problem  may  be worse  as  is  suggested  by  Pluta's  study
which  pe  mits comparison  of current  and constant  price elasticities  for  20
developing  nations  (Table  9).  These elasticities  diverge  considerably  for
individual  countries  --  in  this  case,  constant  price  values  both  exceeding  and
falling  below  current  price estimates. These  results  reflect  the  generally
recognized  unreliability  of  deflators  for  government  spending  which  often  are
based  on  input  prices  and,  hence,  disregard  changes  in  factor  productivity.
In  summary,  although  the data base is not particularly  strong,  the
evidence  on  developing  economies  suggests  the  following:
(1) Government  spending  varies  considerably  across  low  and  middle-income
nations.  In  1985,  central  government  expenditures  as a  share of  GNP  ranged
from  10.8% to  62.1%,  and  government  consumption  as  a  share  of  GDP  ranged  from
6  to  45%. These variations  in reported  government  spending  exceed  those
observed  in  developed  economies;
(2)  Compared  to OECD  countries,  developing  economies,  on  average,  tend  to
devote smaller  percentages  of GDP to government  spending.  This  seems
especially  true  for  low-income  nations;18
(3)  However,  compared  to  the  historical  experience  in  the  now  industrialized
nations,  low  and  middle-income  nation  governments  are  already  consuming  much
higher  fractions  of  GDP;
(4)  The rate of growth  of government  spending  in  low  and  middle-income
economies  shows  a  good  deal  of  variance,  however,  in  at  least  value  terms,  the
elasticity  of Ge  with respect  to GDP  appears,  as  in  the  OECD  setting,  to  be
greater  than  one  in  the  majority  of  cases.  Continued  expansion  in  government
spending  shares,  therefore,  appears  to  be the  norm,  although  in  a  number  of
cases  government's  share  of  national  income  appears  to  have  fallen.  This  last
result  stands  in sharp contrast  to OECD experience  where,  despite  the
political  rhetoric  of  the  1980's,  not  one  nation  has  lowered  its  share of  Ge
to  GDP;
(5)  Looking  at sources  of  growth  in  government  spending,  transfer  payments,
which  are  still  at  low  levels  relative  to  industrialized  economies,  appear  to
be  growing  quickly.  Gc  elasticities,  in  nominal  terms,  tend  to  be  above  unity
but  show  considerable  variance  both  above  and  below  1;
(6) Contrasting  constant  and  current  price  elasticities,  the  available  data
make  it difficult  to draw  any conclusions  about relative  price  changes  for
public  goods,  and  what  contribution  increasing  input  costs are  making to  the
growth  in  public  expenditures  in  developing  nations.19
II. Explainina  the  Growth  in  Government  Expenditures
Explanations  by economists  for why governments  grow have a long
tradition,  dating  at  least  as  far  back  as  the  late-nineteenth  century  writings
of Adolph  Wagner.  More recently,  the evolution  of  positive  theories  of
government,  often  under  the  banner  of  the  "Public  Choice  School",  has  made  the
subject  a  rich  area for  intellectual  and  political  debate.  Surveys  of  this
literature  include  Mueller (1987),  who offers  an especially  up-to-date
treatment. 20
What  the surveys  reveal  is  that  the  literature  on  government  expansion
has  had  an  almost  exclusive  focus  on  developed  economies. Accounting  for  the
growth  of government  in developing  countries,  therefore,  involves  less  a
review  of  previous  studies  than  it does  suggesting  how  concepts  employed  in
industrialized  settings  can  be  applied  to  developing  nations.  These  concepts
or  basic  approaches  to  understanding  government  growth  can  be  labelled:
(a)  "cost-accounting";  (b)  demand-side  arguments  and (c)  supply-side  factors.
One  additional  set  of  explanations,  also  operating  on  the  demand-side,
(d)  "development  theorizing",  is  also  considered  below.
A.  "Cost-Accounting"
The  "cost-accounting"  approach  is  employed  by  Saunders  and  Klau  (1985)
in  their  analysis  of  spending  growth  in  OECD economies. These  authors  admit
that  they are  not directly  contributing  to  the  debate  over  a  positive  theory
of  government,  but  rather,  are  simply  trying  to decompose  the growth  in  OECD
fiscal  expenditures  in a  meaningful  way.21  Specifically,  they  look  at
government  programs  including,  education,  health and social security,  and20
separate the  effects of  demographic influences, coverage changes, and
increases  in real  benefits. Growth  in pension expenditures,  for  example,  is
found due  to  an  expanding system of  entitlements resulting from  both
demographics  and  the  broadening of coverage.  In  health  and  education,  the
level  of benefits  has  grown  more than  the  number  of beneficiaries.
Comparable analysis of  government budgets over  a  broad  range  of
expenditure categories and/or countries does  not  appear to  have  been
undertaken  for  the  developing world. Nonetheless,  this  type  of approach  has
much  to recommend  it.  It  would  be useful  to know by  how  much rapid  population
growth  and  subsequent  demographic  transitions  account  for  growth  in  government
consumption.  A better  understanding  of how  social services  expenditures  have
grown  in  developing  nations  might  contribute  to discussions  of the  role  to be
played  by  means  testing  and  cost  recovery  in government  programs.
Expanded versions of  the  "cost-accounting"  approach could  further
decompose  the  growth  in  government  spending  between  increases  in  real  benefits
and  number  of beneficiaries,  versus  changes in the  unit  costs  of providing
these  benefits. Such  a decomposition  could  reveal  the  relative  growth  in  real
versus  nominal  expenditures.  Lastly,  a broad  enough  cost-accounting  framework
might  be  able  to  capture the  impact of  state  enterprises  on all  public
expenditures.  One  might  observe  that while  advanced economy  public  sector
obligations have  increased due  to  expanding systems of entitlements  and
benefit  levels,  in  developing economies increasing state  ownership of the
means  of production  may  play  a dominant  role.21
B.  Demand-Side  Arguments
The  "cost-accounting"  approach admittedly leaves  the  basic  question
begging,  that is,  why  does  the society  want,  permit  or accept  a  growing  share
of  output to  be  controlled by  the  public  sector? The literature  on this
subject  aims  for  a  positive  theory of government.  On  the  demand-side  the
arguments include Wagner's  law, preference explanations, and  the  models
referred  to as public  choice  theories.
Wagner's law  fits  neatly  into a  traditional analysis of demand.
Wagner's  argument,  which  is  more  appealing  for  merit  goods  than for  transfers,
is over  the  value  of the  income  elasticity for  public goods.  Wagner  gives
many  reasons why  he  believes this  elasticity will  be  positive 22, most
revolving  around the  increasing demand  for  public  goods  resulting  from  the
requirements of  industrialization  itself.  Furthermore,  if one  accepts  the
hypothesis  that  the  price  of  public goods  relative to  all  other  goods  is
likely  to  rise  over  time,  the  income  elasticity  will  have to  be larger  than
the  price  elasticity  if  Wagner's  argument,  alone,  is  to account  for  government
spending  growing as a  share  of  national  output. Ram's  1987  results  on real
government  expenditure  elasticities suggest minimal support for  this  last
proposition. However,  given  questions  about  the  reliability  of any  government
price  deflator, a  more  conservative conclusion is  simply that  Wagner's
hypothesis, at  best,  accounts for  only  some  of the  growth  in  government
spending  in  both developed  and  developing  nations.
Another  demand-side  argument  concerns  tastes. Can  growth  in  government
spending  be  explained  by  a society's increasing  preference for  public  over22
private  spending? If tastes  are  a  determining  factor,  this  may reflect  either
increasing preferences for  public over  private goods,  or  more likely,  an
increasing  preference  for  public  over  private  production.
The  notion  of increasing  preferences  for  public  over  private  goods  is
rejected by  Mueller.  His  argument is  that  increasing urbanization--
debatably  a  proxy  taste parameter  for  public  goods 23 --  is  not  empirically
associated  with  higher  levels of government  spending  across  countries. With
regard  to preferences  for  public  over  private  production,  a host  of arguments
can  be raised. Musgrave  (1982)  offers  the  following  list:
The rationale  for  public  employment  differs  with the
context  in  which  pu..blic  employment  arises. It  may be
called  for  (1)  as a  mere byproduct  of public  production
undertaken  as  an alternative  of regulating  natural
monopolies  or of correcting  for  externalities;
(2)  because  the  very  quality  of the  desired  output
requires  public  production;  (3)  because  workers  prefer
public  to private  employment;  (4)  as an instrument  of
job  creation;  or (5)  as a  way of dealing  with structural
maladjustments  in the  labor  market. Public  production,
of course,  may also  occur  where  none  of these  justifications
applies. Public  production  may simply  reflect  institutionally
embedded  practices  or,  not infrequently,  the  interest  of
politicians. 24
Musgrave's  list  clearly  goes  beyond  any  simple  notion  of taste
differences  as a determinant  of government  growth. In the  developing  world,
many  of his arguments  could  account  for  expansion  in  public  expenditures
including  those  which  emphasize  the  political  economy  which  influences
government  production  and  employment  decisions.
The theme  of political  economy  is central  to another  set  of demand-side
factors  which  seek  to  explain  government  growth. The so-called  public  choice23
school  embodies  a number  of models,  including  median  voter  and  public  employee
voting  behavior,  as well as theories  of bureaucracy. Common  to these
arguments,  and  distinct  from  more traditional  demand-side  approaches,  is  a
focus  on who is  demanding  more government  and  how this  demand  results  in
excessive  government  expenditures.
Application  of the  public  choice  framework  to the  developing  country
context  raises  a number  of problems. For  one,  many  of the  basic  arguments  are
ably contested  in the  advanced  economy  setting. Second,  models  based  on the
calculus  of public  choice  would  seem  to require  systems  of reasonably  fair  and
democratic  elections,  circumstances  not  well matched  ii  authoritarian  states.
While  all  nations,  regardless  of political  structure,  m-st resolve  conflicts
between  vested  interests,  the  explanatory  powers  of the  public  choice
apparatus  seems  weakened  if  democratic  institutions  are absent. Models  of
bureaucracy  where  the  wishes  of the  state  are placed  above  those  of the
citizens  may be more  promising. In such  models,  "Citizens  and  political
institutions  constitute  at most (loose)  constraints  against  which  political
leaders  and  bureaucrats  pursue  their  own  personal  interests." 25 For  the
developing  world,  this approach  has a familiar  ring  to it.
C.  Supply-side  Factors
On the  supply-side  there  arc  at least  two  distinct  arguments. One is
the  unbalanced  growth  idea,  most often  attributed  to Baumol  (1967)  and  noted
earlier. According  to Baumol,  productivity  growth  is slower  in services  than
in  non-services,  primarily  due to differential  rates  of technological  change.
However,  wage payments  are  equalized  across  sectors. Since  government24
production  tends  to be service-intensive,  the  model  predicts  the increasing
cost  of government  output  if  real levels  of publicly  provided  goods  and
services  are  to be maintained. (Obviously  this  argument  need  not apply  to the
transfers  part  of government  expenditures.)  While -umol's  theoretical
premise  has  not  been  subjected  to much  empirical  verification 26, more
attention  should  be  paid to the  unit  costs  of government  production  as a
determinant  of the  growth  in government  spending. However,  even if  the  unit
costs  of government  relative  to  private  production  are  found  to increase  over
time,  factors  other  than  Baumol's  differential  technology  dynamic,  for
example,  greater  inefficiency  in  public  versus  private  production  due  to
"softer"  budget  constraints,  may  be at work.
The other  set  of supply-side  arguments  can  be dubbed,  "Says  Law  of
Government  Spending",  that  is,  public  expenditures  are  driven  by the
availability  of revenues. Peacock  and  Wisenan  (1961),  in  essence,  make this
point  in  their  ratchet  model  (also  referred  to as the  "displacement  effect
hypothesis")  of long-term  government  expenditure  growth  in the  United  Kingdom.
Taxpayer  acceptance  of tolerable  levels  of tax  burden  change  over time,  not in
a continuous  manner,  but  in discrete  steps  usually  following  events  like  wars
or major  economic  downturns. In the  development  setting,  the  "Please  Effect",
is somewhat  analagous. 27 Once  again,  public  expenditures,  especially  for
consumption,  are  driven  by available  resources  rather  than  vice  versa.  If
there  exists  a policy  bias  toward  increasing  the  rate of  domestic  savings
through  greater  public  saving,  growing  tax  revenues  may  translate  into  more
spending,  perhaps,  on public  investment,  but,  according  to Please  (1967),  as
likely  on government  consumption.  What these  explanations  share  in  common  is25
a  focus  on  the  "willingness-to-pay"  for  government.  As  such,  they  probably
require  some  demand-side  argument  to  account  for  why  such  willingness  is,  in
fact,  taken  advantage  of.
D. Development  Theorizing
Any  explanation  for  the  growth  in  government  in  developing  countries
must  come  to  terms  with  at  least  two  empirical  facts.  One  is  that  the
developing  nations  have  higher  shares  of  government  out  of  GDP  than  did  the
now  advanced  economies  when  they  were  at  comparable  levels  of  per  capita
income.  The  other  is  that  there  exists  a  general  trend  toward  an  increase  in
these  shares  over  time.
The  first  observation  is  easier  to  account  for  than  the  second.  The
technology  of  statehood  is  different  today  than  it  was  in  the  eighteenth  and
nineteenth  centuries.  The  requirements  of  membership  in  the  world  of  nations
requires,  for  example,  far  more  ambassadors  today.  The  same  could  be  said
about  public  health  specialists,  airline  flight  controllers,  customs  agents,
etc.
Turning  to  the  second  point,  since  we  do  not  have  a  generally  accepted
positive  theory  of  government  growth  for  the  advanced  economies,  we  should  not
have  high  expectations  for  finding  one  for  the  developing  nations.  But  one
factor  unique  to  the  developing  nations  may  be  the  role  of  the  last  25-30
years  of  development  theorizing  and  subsequent  policy  advice  and  directions.
Since  the  late  1940s  and  early  1950s  development  models  have  often  emphasized
the  extent  of  market  failure  in  developing  countries.  The  language  of26
tneories  which  have  long  since  gone  out  of  fashion  evoke  an  image  of  the  need
for  more  government.  The  Critical  Minimum  Effort,  the  Big  Push,  Balanced
Growth,  Redistribution  With  Growth,  and  A  F isic  Needs  Strategy  all  suggest
more  and  not  less  government. 28 Similarly,  the  seminal  works  of  Denison  and
Schultz  on  sources  of  economic  growth,  and  their  emphasis  on  the  importance  of
human  capital 29 implicitly  advocate  more  spending  on  education  and  health
care,  traditional  domains  for  government  expenditures.  While  the  last  decade
of  development  theorizing  has  witnessed  a  marked  reversal  in  orientation,  with
the  market  place  not  government  prominently  featured  as  the  engine  of  growth,
earlier  theories  and  their  legacy  may  have  had  an  influence  on  the  expansion
of  the  public  sectors  of  many  developing  courntries.
If  added  to  this  kettle  of  abstract  thinking  are  (1)  the  role  of  both
multilateral  and  bilateral  aid  and  their  requirements  for  public  not  private
sector  counterparts;  and,  (2)  the  "demonstration  effect"  of  successful
capitalist  and  socialist  countries,  both  with  large  and  growing  state  sectors,
then  it  should  come as  no  surprise  that  government  growth  in  developing
nations  received  support  if  not  inspiration  from  the  developed  countries.
Practice  and  advice  may,  therefore,  have  operated  on  the  demand-side  to
further  encourage  Third  World  leaders  to  expand  the  public  sector's  share  of
national  output.27
NOTES
*  The  author  would  like  to thank  Johannes  Linn,  Emmanuel  Jimenez,  and  Bela
Balassa  for  their  comments.
1.  The  World  Development  Report,  1987  essentially  places  its  emphasis  on the
role  of government  as a regulator  of economic  activity,  not  as a direct
economic  agent.
2.  Studies  which  measure  the  size  of government  in  terms  of taxes  include
Marsden  (1983)  and  Skinner  (1987).
3.  National  income  accounting  treatment  of public  enterprises  is discussed  in
Pathirane  and  Blades(1982).
4.  Evidence  on the  growth  in state  enterprises  can  be found  in  Short  (1984).
Although  heavily  qualified,  Short  provides  estimates  of the  average  percentage
share  of public  enterprise  output  out  of GDP  at factor  costs  for  industrial
countries  (9.6%)  and  daveloping  countries  (8.6%). The  variance  around  these
averages,  not  surprisingly,  is  large.
5.  Saunders  and  Klau(1985),  p. 28.
6.  For  a critique  of Baumol's  hypothesis,  see  Mueller  (1987),  pp. 120-21,  and
the  papers  cited  therein.
7.  Pluta(1981),  Ram(1987)  and  Beck(1979,1982)  advocate  and  employ  constant
prices  in  their  estimates  of the  share  of government  expenditures  out  of  GDP.
Musgrave(1981),  pp.  84-87,  argues  in favor  of the  use  of current  price
estimates.
8.  See  Ram (1986a,  1986b,  1987).
9.  A  longer  and  more global  perspective  is  given in  Webber  and
Wildavsky(1986).  They devote  several  hundred  pages  to tax  and  expenditure
issues  from  the  ancient  through  the  medieval  world.
10.  Peltzman(1980)  updates  the  Peacock  and  Wiseman(1961)  series.
11  Musgrave(1981),  p. 83.
12.  Beck(1979)  makes  a similar  point  for  13  OECD  nations,  including  the  U.S.,
for  the  period  1950  to 1977. He concludes,  "...  much,  if  not  most,  of the
increase  in  government  consumption  expenditure  has  resulted  from  higher  costs,
rather  than  expansion  of volume."  (p.314)28
13.  This  point  is confirmed  statistically  by the  work  of Chenery  and
Syrquin(1975).  They regress  the  share  of Gc out  of GDP  as a function  of per
capita  income,  population,  net resource  inflow  and  a number  of time  trends.
The data  are  a pooled  time  series  of developed  and  developing  nations. The
government  consumption  equation  is  one  of twelve  relationships  considered
part of the  "resource  allocation  process." Other  such  relationships  include
the  share  of GDP  accounted  for  by primary  production,  exports,  etc.  Of the
twelve  separate  resource  allocation  regressions,  the  Gc equation  has  the
lowest  R2, by far,  equaling  only .083. (See  their  Table  5.)
14.  The  proposition  that in  a growing  economy  the  scale  of government
activity  tends  to expand  relative  to the  national  economy  is  attributed  to
Adolph  Wagner(1890). It is  most often  interpreted  to refer  to government
consumption  and  not  government  transfer  payment  expenditures.  The
relationship  has been  subject  to considerable  empirical  and  theoretical  debate
in  the literature.  Ram(1987)  contains  useful  references.
15.  The  problems  with comparing  the  two studies  are: (1)  they  differ  in  terms
of what is included  as government  expenditure,  with the  OECD  study  employing  a
more  comprehensive  definition;  and, (2)  the time  periods  differ,  roughly  1960
to 1975  for  developing  economies,  and 1960  to 1982  for  OECD  nations.
16.  The  high  elasticities  of Gt in  Pluta's  sample  reflect  the  low levels  of
transfer  payments  in  developing  economies. The  median  value  of the  share  of
Gt out  of  GDP in  the  sample  is  only  2.6% in 1960.
17.  Ram (1987),  p. 196.
18.  On this  point,  see,  again,  Ram (1987),  especially  note 1, for  a listing
of the  relevant  theoretical  literature.
19.  In all  fairness  to  Ram,  he does  acknowledge  this  limitation  of  his data
and  argues  for the  robustness  of his  results,  especially  in  terms  of  his  main
purpose  which  is  an empirical  test  of Wagner's  "Law"  which is  usually  viewed
as exclusive  of transfers. (see  Ram(1987),  pp. 202-3.)
20.  Musgrave  (1981)  offers  an often  cited  critique  of the  public  choice  view
of government  expansion.
21.  Saunders  and  Klau (1985),  Section  III.
22.  Recall,  the  alternative  contemporary  formulations  of  Wagner's  law  are  the
elasticity  of Gc with respect  to  GDP  versus  the elasticity  of  GC/GDP  with
respect  to GDP  per  capita. Since  the latter  formulation  is generally  seen  as
capturing  Wagner's  original  hypothesis,  the  presence  of  a positive  elasticity
is the  appropriate  empirical  test.
23.  Mueller(1987)  argues  as follows. "The  very  definitions  of public  goods
and  externalities  connote  geographic  proximity. [For  example,  t]he  smoke  from
a factory  harms  more individuals  in  a densely  populated  community  than  when
the  population  is thinly  dispersed  around  the  factory."(p.119)  Urbanization
or population  density,  thus,  can  be construed  as a "taste  parameter"  for29
public  goods  which  is  hypothesized  to be positively  associated  with  the level
of government  expenditures.
24.  Musgrave  (1982).  p. 17-18.
25.  Mueller  (1987),  p. 142.
26.  Mueller  (1987)  cites  Pommerchne  and  Schneider  (1982)  as at least  offering
an indirect  test  of Baumol's  hypothesis. Their  results  on government  spending
by Swiss  municipalities  supports  Baumol's  conclusions.
27.  This effect  is  attributed  to Stanley  Please  on the basis  of arguments
contained  in Please  (1967).
28.  Arndt (1987),  although  not  suggesting  this  particular  perspective,  offers
a comprehensive  review  of development  theorizing  over  time.
29.  The  often  cited  works  of these  authors  include  Denison  (1962)  and  Schultz
(1961).30
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TABLE  1
Government  Expenditure  in Relation  to National  Income
and  Gross  National  Product  in the  United  States,  1799-1985
Federal.
Total  Total  State. and
Federal  Federal  Total  Total  Local
Expendi.  Expendi.  Federal  Federal  Expendi.  Federal.
tures  turn  Expendi.  Expendi-  tures  State.
(in  (As percent.  ture  tures (As  (In  and Local
millions  age of  (As perent.  percent.  millions Expenditures
of current  national  age  of  age of  of current (As percent.
doUlan)  income)  GCNP)  GNP)  dollars)  age of GNP)
Year  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)
1799  10  1.4
1809  10  1.1
1819  21  2.4
1829  is  1.6
1839  27  1.6
1849  42  1.7
1859  66  1.5
1869  316  4.6  5.C
1879  267  3.7  3.2
1889  309  2.9  2.6
1899  563  3.4
1909  694  2.3
1919  12.402  16.7
1929  3.100  3.0  3.0  10.-00  10.0
1939  8.800  11.7  9.7  17.600  19.4
1949  38.00  16.2  15.0  59,300  23.0
1959  92.100  18.9  131,000  26.8
1969  183.600  19.4  286.800  30.4
1979  503.500  20.8  750.800  31.1
1984  851.800  23.3  1.258.100  34.4
1985' 959.100
Sourows:  Figures  for  columns  2  and  3 are from  Kendrick  (1955.  pp. 10-12;  for
column  3. KeIndncck  reports  data from Kuzneez).  Figures  for columns  4, 5. and
6 are from United  States. Economic  Repon  of the  Presiden*  (1985  and 1986.
Tables 81.  B72. and 8-74).
*Prelimanamy  figure.
Source:  Mueller  (1987),  Table  133
Table  2: Government  Consumption  as a Share  of GNP (2)
United  KinRdom  Germany
1860-79  4.8  1851-70  4.0
1880-99  5.8  1871-90  5.9
1900-14  7.4  1891-1913  7.1
1921-29  8.9  1928  7.2
1950-58  16.9  1950-59  14.4
Italy  Denmark






1865-74  3.8  1861-80  4.4
1875-94  4.8  1881-1900  5.4
1895-1914  6.6  1901-20  5.8
1915-24  8.5  1921-40  8.6
1925-34  8.7  1941-59  14.3
1950-59  12.5  1950-59  16.8
United  States  Canada
1869-88  3.6  1870  and 1890  5.6
1889-1908  4.4  1890,  1900,  1910  7.4
1909-28  4.9  1920,  1929  10.5
1929-38  9.4  1926-30  7.5
1946-55  15.4  1950-59  14.1
1950-59  17.9
Australia  Japan







Source: Kuznets  (1966),  Table  5.3.34
Table  3
Ge,uu  Govumme  Expilurv  and  Rwe  in R lauton
to GwOsr  Domwtic  Ptduct at Currewns  Puica  in OECD  Counra
(In percent)
1960  1982
Country  Expenditure  Revenue  Expenditure  Rcnue
Auralia  22.1  25.4  36.3  34.2
Ausria  32.1  31.0  50.3  46.7
Delgium  30.3  27.5  56.6  45.3
Canada  28.9  26.0  56.S  45.4
Denmack  24.8  . 27.3  60.7  50.7
Finland  26.7  30.0  41.3  39.7
Frarnc  34.6  34.9  50.7  46.9
Germany,  Fed. Rep. of  32.5  35.1  49.4  45.3
Greets  17.4  21.1  37.040  31.3
Iceland  (1960-80)  28.2  36.4  34.4  36.0
Ireland  (1960-81)  28.0  24.8  57.1  42.3
Italy  30.1  28.8  53.7  41.5
Japan  18.3  20.7  34.2  30.2
Luxembourg  (1960-80)  30.5  32.5  54.3  51.5
Netherlands  33.7  33.9  63.7  55.8
Noray  29.9  33.1  48.8  52.8
Portugal  (1960-81)  17.0  17.6  42.7  33.2
Span (1964-81)  18.8  18.8  34.1  30.6
Sweden  31.1  32.2  67.3  59.7
Switzerland  17.2  23.3  30.0  33.2
Turkey  (1962)  18.0  19.1  ...  ...
United  Kingdom  32.6  30.3  47.4  43.7
United  States  27.6  27.3  37.6  32.0
Mean  (unwighed)  26.3  27.7  47.0  41.9
Coefflcient  of vmatiou  0.24  0.21  0.22  0.21
*Fwromt  dissmmts  ousy.
Source:  Mueller  (1987),  Table  2;
Taken  from  Saunders  and  Klau  (1985),
Table  2.35
Table  4
Total  General  Government  Expenditure,  1960-83
(Percent  of  GDP)
1960  1971  1975  1983
United  States  27.5  32.3  35.6  38.1
Japan  18.3  20.8  27.3  34.8
Germany,  Fed.  Rep.  of  32.4  40.1  48.9  48.6
France  34.6  38.3  43.5  51.5
United  Kingdom  32.4  38.1  46.4  47.2
Italy  30.1  36.6  43.2  57.4
Canada  28.9  36.6  40.8  46.8
Average  of the  above  29.2  34.7  40.8  46.3
Australia  22.1  26.2  32.3  36.4 1/
Austria  32.1  39.7  46.1  50.4 1/
Belgium  30.3  38.0  44.5  56.3
Denmark  24.8  43.0  48.2  61.1
Finland  26.6  32.1  36.3  40.3
Greece  17.4  22.8  26.7  38.3
Iceland  28.2  32.6  38.7  34.4 I/
Ireland  28.0  40.5  46.6  54.7
Luxembourg  30.5  36.3  48.9  60.8
Netherlands  33.7  48.0  56.6  62.8
Norway  29.9  43.0  46.6  48.9
Portugal  17.0  21.3  30.3  42.5 1/
Spain  18.8  23.6  24.7  36.6 1/
Sweden  31.1  45.8  49.3  66.8 1/
Switzerland  17.2  21.9  28.7  30.8
Average  of the  above  25.8  34.3  40.3  48.1
Overall  average  26.9  34.4  4G.5  47.5
;Source: OECD and  EC.
1/  Refers  to either  1981  or 1982.
Source:  Tanzi  (1986),  Table  2.36
Table  5:  General  Government  Expenditure  Elasticities
With  Respect  to GDP
Period  Total  Consumption  Transfers  Investment
Australia  1960-1982  1.19  1.24  1.18  1.00
Austria  1964-1982  1.18  1.21  1.24  0.95
Belgium  1960-1982  1.31  1.22  1.38  1.19
Canada  1960-1982  1.19  1.16  1.30  0.90
Denmark  1971  1982  1.29  1.22  1.49  1.78
Finland  1960-1982  1.14  1.17  1.18  0.91
France  1960-1982  1.12  1.08  1.19  0.87
Germany  1960-1982  1.25  1.25  1.32  0.97
Greece  1960-1982  1.21  1.15  1.29  *
Iceland  1960-1980  1.07  1.07  1.06  1.08
Ireland  1970-1981  1.19  1.20  1.21  1.05
Italy  1960-1982  1.19  1.09  1.28  1.10
Japan  1965-1982  1.32  1.16  1.54  1.14
Luxembourg  1970-1980  1.55  1.46  1.60  1.51
Netherlands  1960-1979  1.28  1.13  1.47  0.89
New  Zealand  1960-1982  *  1.19  *  *
Norway  1962-1982  1.22  1.15  1.31  1.00
Portugal  1960-1976  1.26  1.10  1.52  1.28
Spain  1964-1981  1.20  1.16  1.31  0.94
Sweden  1960-1982  1.35  1.30  1.53  0.96
Switzerland  1960-1982  1.37  1.21  1.53  *
Turkey  1962-1972  1.11  1.09  1.32  1.00
United  Kingdom 1960-1982  1.15  1.12  1.21  0.95
United  States  1960-1982  1.13  1.02  1.41  0.58
Mean  1.23  1.17  1.34  1.00
Median  1.20  1.16  1.31  1.00
*  Not available.
Source: Saunders  and  Klau (1985),  Table 3.37
Table  6: Trends  in  the  United  States  Government  Budget
1940  1950  1960  1970  1980  1986
I. Public  Expenditures  as  Percent  of  GNP,  Current  Prices
1.  Total  Expenditures  18.4  21.3  26.9  31.8  32.6  35.3
2.  National  Defense  2.2  4.9  8.8  7.5  5.2  6.6
3.  Civilian  16.2  16.4  18.1  24.3  27.4  28.7
4.  Total  Expendicures  18.4  21.3  26.9  31.8  32.6  35.3
5.  Federal  10.0  14.2  18.3  20.8  22.5  24.5
6.  State  and  Local  8.4  7.1  8.6  11.0  10.1  10.8
7.  Total  Expenditures  18.4  21.3  26.9  31.8  32.6  35.3
8.  Purchases  14.2  13.4  19.8  22.3  19.4  20.6
9.  Transfers  4.2  7.9  7.1  9.5  13.2  14.7
10. Total  Purchases  14.2  13.4  19.8  22.3  19.4  20.6
11. National  Defense  2.2  4.9  8.8  7.5  5.2  6.6
12. Civilian  12.0  8.5  11.0  14.8  14.2  14.0
II. Pub:,ic  Expenditures  as  Percent  of  GNP,  1982  Prices
13. Total  Purchases  19.4  19.1  24.6  24.6  19.5  20.3
14. National  Defense  3.0  7.2  11.0  8.5  5.3  6.9
15. Civilian  16.4  11.9  13.6  16.1  14.2  13.4
Line  2:  Includes  National  Defense  purchases  only.
Line  3:  Line  1  minus  Line  2.
Line  6:  Federal  grants  included  at  federal  level.
Line  9:  Includes  interest.
Line  14: National  Defense  expenditures  are  deflated  by  index  for  federal
purchases.
Line  15: Line  13  minus  Line  14.
Source:  Musgrave  (1981),  Table  1  (updated).38
Table  7: Government  Spending  Out  of  National  Income  (%)
Central  G,/GNP  GC/GDP
1972  1985  1965  1985
A. Low-Income
1. Median  19.7  19.7  11  12
2. Range  8.5-34.0  12.5-37.6  6-23  6-20
3. %  with  growing
or  constant
government  share  75  56
4.  (#  Observations)  (12)  (25)
B. Lower  Middle  Income
1. Median  16.7  22.7  12  14
2. Range  9.6-43.2  10.8-48.2  5-34  7.45
3. %  with  growing
or  constant
government  share  76  74
4.  (#  Observations)  (17)  (31)
C. Upper  Middle  Income
1. Median  19.6  24.8  12  13
2. Range  12.7-62.1  6.9- 62. 1a  7-20  7-21
3. %  with  growing
or  constant
government  share  70  78
4.  (#  Observations)  (10)  (18)
D.  Industrialized  Market
1. Median  28.5  38.2  14  19
2. Range  12.7-40.8  17.8-57.1  7-18  10-27
3. %  with  growing
or  constant
government  share  100  100
4. (#  Observations)  (18)  (19)
a  Israel,  a  middle-income  country,  reports  a  share  above  this  range,  97.6%.
However,  this  value  was  omitted  because  it  seems  particularly
unrepresentative.
Source:  Worl4  Bank  (1987),  Tables  5  and  23.39
Table  8
Governmens  Eapenditure  u  a Percent  of GDP. Growing Public  Sectors
(Rankcd  Atcording  go Most Rapid  Real  Growth)
to Constant  (1960)  Prices  In Current  Prices
Beginning  ot Period|  End  of Period  End ot Period
Country  G  G,  0G  G  G,  GI  G  G,  0,
Pakistan  7.0  6.5  0.5  1l.8  9.9  3.9  14.6  10.8  3.9
llonduru  8.7  8.0  0.7  12.7  11.2  1.5  14.1  12.6  1.5
Chile  16.0  9.7  6.4  23.8  11.5  10.3  19  9  12.2  7.7
Cyprus  17.7  55.9  1.8  26.7  14.1  12S  27.8  16.3  11.S
Tuwkey  13.2  10.5  2.7  19.8  11.2  8.6  213  13.9  8.4
Bolivia  10.4  8.7  1.8  14.2  12.6  1.6  14.2  12.6  1.6
Paanma  15.S  11.2  4.7  21.7  12.9  8.3  23.5  15.1  8.4
Peru  13.8  8.S  5.4  17.8  9.7  8.1  20.3  13.0  7.3
Philippines  12.8  3.l  4.7  16.5  3.7  7.8  17.5  9.3  7.7
ThaiLand  13.0  100  3.1  16.3  11.1  5.2  15.7  10.4  5.3
Singapore  16.7  7.3  9.4  20.5  9.9  10  6  20.0  9.6  10.4
Colombia  7.6  6.1  1.5  8.4  6.4  2.0  9.2  7.3  1.9
Guatemala  9.6  7.0  2.6  10.2  6.2  4 0  10.11  6.7  4.2
MEDIAN (13  13.0  8.5  2.7  16.5  11.1  .8  17.5  12.2  7.3
owins
public  sectors)
MEDIAN (AU  13.1  9.9  2.6  16.4  10.5  7.0  17.4  10.8  6.3
20  countriea)
Governmacnt  Eupenditure  as  a Percent  of GDP. Declining  Public  Secors
(Rauiked  Ac:osdIug  to Moat  Rapid  Reall  Dccline)
In Constant  (1960)  Prices  In Curnent  Prices
Becinning  ot Petriod  J  End  of Pctiod  Eud  of Period
Country  0  G,  G,  G  G,  G,  0  G,  0,
Brail  10.4  10.I  0.3  7.6  6.9  0.6  10.8  10.3  0.5
Tsiwao  21.2  19.1  1.4  15.7  9.7  6.1  208  15.6  5.2
Parupay  10.6  *.1  A.6  9.5  6.9  2.6  1.5  6e.  2.5
Argtina  10.2  8.2  2.0  9.3  6.3  3  0  14.0  10.0  4.0
Dona.  18.3  11.6  6.7  17.3  6.6  J0.7  I7.3  6.4  10.3
Republic
S,iLaaka  27.5  14.4  13.1  26.5  114  15.1  30.0  11.6  13.5
Soutb  Korea  57.5  15.0  2.5  17.0  .1  7.9  19.2  10.8  3.4
MEDIAN  (7de.  17.5  11.6  2.5  15.7  6.9  6.1  17.3  10.3  5.2
clisia pub-
ll  sectons)
MEDIAN  (aI  13.1  9.9  16  16.4  50.5  7.0-I  7.4  10.8  63
2Sour  P1Tb)
Source:  P;uta  (198.1),  Table  3  and  4.40
Table  9
Income  Elasticity  of Govemment  Expenditure  Late 195&  to Mid  1970e
(Ranked  According  to Most  Rapid  Rel  Growth)
Conttant  Prie"  Current Prica'
Country  G  0.  G.  G  G,  G.
Pakistan  4.09  2.30  26.49  2.54  1.91  11.34
lhonduras  2.41  2.22  4.62  2.00  1.92  2.99
Chile  2.40  2.16  2.76  1.26  1.25  1.23
Cyprus  2.24  0.73  15.45  2.05  1.15  9.47
Turkey  1.99  1.12  5.45  1.86  1.40  3.68
Bolivia  1.75  1.95  0.7  1.43  1.53  0.93
Panama  1.62  1.26  2.48  1.66  1.4t  2.09
Pcru  1.49  1.25  1.86  1.50  1.55  1.40
Philippines  1.49  1.12  2.13  1.45  1.2t  1.73
Thailand  1.35  1.16  1.99  1.2S  1.06  1.85
Singapoiw  1.33  1.52  1.13  1.21  1.32  1.13
Colombia  1.19  1.0t  1.62  1.25  1.25  1.26
Guatemala  1.11  0.79  1.97  1.11  0.92  1.35
South  Korea  0.96  0.49  3.86  1.19  0.71  3.68
Sfi Lanka  0.94  061  1.29  1.13  0.74  1.57
Dominican  Republic  0.90  0.17  2.15  1.00  0.48  1.81
Argentina  0.87  0.59  I."  1.1  0.99  2.136
Patrguay  0.60  0.74  0.98  0.76  0.70  0.96
Taiwan  0.64  0.26  5.58  0.96  0.74  3.99
Brruil  0.57  0.51  2.51  0.37  0.13  6.55
MEDIAN (all 20  1.34  1.10  2.14  1.25  1.20  1.65
countries)
MEDIAN (13  growing  1.62  1.25  2.13  1.45  1.32  1.85
public ectors)
MEDIAN (7 declin.  0.67  0.51  2.1S  1.00  0.74  2.36
ing public  sectors)
NOTES:
I In nearlyalcases  eludtictycoeltidents  In  this  table.  expenditure  to C.DP  ratios  in Tables  3and  4.
and  indexes  of govermment  expendituft  in Table  5 were  calculated  from three-year  avrages  of  fucal
and income  data. While  5be  actual  yeare  used  very somewhat  between  countries  because  of data
mvrihbilityn  an  effout  wa made  to  selct three  years  from the  late  1950e  and  the  latest  three  yets for
which  datswe  avoilable.  The ctual  years  ued for eaeh  countr)  re listed  in Table  5.
a  * total government  expenditure
. a governmt consumption  expenditure
0.  * sovement utnsfers
Source:  Pluta  (1981),  Table  1.Table  10
INcOtN  AND  GovEwtNF?t  ExPSEIDITIIFS:  sUIttARt  or  OF  AEtsrtiras  istoi  Tisir-SfalES  DArA FOR  IS  COsmYat  lES'
Less  Jeveloeil  Developed  Central/S.milh
Full Sanple  Couninies  l .)Cs)  Countries  II)Cs)  American  LDCs  African  LDCs  Asian LD)Cs Range  1950-t0  1960-0  1950-80  1960-80  1950-S0  196W-S0 1950-SO 1960-SO  19SO-1O 1960-U)  19SO-U)  1960-10
A. Elaslicity  of General  c;twemment  Share  (G/V) with Respet  to GDP Per  Capita  (PCY): Nunmher  of Conntries  in Various  Ranges
Below-0.s  3  12  2  12  1  0  2  3  0  S  0  0 -026to  -050  11  17  5  13  6  4  2  4  1  6  1  3 ono to -0.25  I)  16  9  12  4  4  6  4  1  5  I  I 001 oO.2S  II  22  6  17  S  S  4  5  0  7  2  4 0.26  to  0 50  14  21  9  14  5  7  3  I  2  6  2  4 0.1  toO.75  IS  5  14  0  1  2  3  2  t  1  2 shove0.75  6  12  6  12  0  0  2  4  3  3  i  s Total  63  IIS  42  94  21  21  21  24  9  43  S.  19
N4egatlve  and statis.
tically significantb  14  23  6  17  8  6  3  4  0  t  2  3 Negalive  but  siatis.
tically insignificant  13  22  10  20  3  2  7  7  2  11  0  1 Positive  and  statis- 
J ticallysignilicantb  24  43  16  33  t  10  5  7  6  13  3  10  w Positive  but smatis-
tically insignificant  12  27  In  24  2  3  6  6  1  11  3  S Mean  Value  0023  0.14  -0.04  00t  013  001  054  004  025  049
D  Elastikity  of CGeneral  Goernvment  Expenditure  (G) pith Respect  to  Aggregate  GDP  (V  V:  Number  of Countries  In Varios Ranges
RetowO  O  0  2  0  2  0  0  0  0  0  1  0  1 0001oO2S  0  4  0  4  0  0  0  1  0  2  0  0 026100 50  0  2  0  2  0  0  0  0  0  2  0  0 051 toO.75  9  9  4  5  5  4  2  2  0  2  1  1 0 76to0 00  14  24  t  20  6  4  6  S  0  9  1  4 Above  I  on  40  74  30  61  10  13  13  16  9  27  6  13
Total  63  115  42  94  21  21  21  24  9  43  t  19 Si*nilicantly
greater  than  unityb  32  54  24  43  t  11  10  10  6  20  4  11 Mean  Value  1.12  1.14  1.19  1.16  0.97  106  1.14  1.18  1.s0  1.15  1.07  1.23
*  e ltnicities  we sitimaued  by eegstnln te  attal  d tt  lfauim  of lGtIot  tcee  of  PC,.  and of Gan obt ri V Estitmatm k dnne  by a feasibIe  gentralieee  tStese  tquar  petcedwe  buid  s. dce  pft.utse  d a uegs,-adee  sv  iregresite se,habec  dh_t,baae tses tbe pactge mwd  is Ssuusal  Att)tis  System  ISASI. a"  the  proiedue  -t#d is AUtOREG  Detaited  ces,smaes  I.v iidust  cows  we  ia.  atabie from  _  t
elw  Wgakwe  of aU  rltm  ts  is eamsdea.  foe  th  ppaI  . to  fNs  te.  uf  d.  SS tee
Source:  Ram  (1987),  Table  1.PPR  Work!ng  Paper  Series
Title  Author  Date  Contact
WPS22  Methodological  Problems  in  Cross-
Country  Analyses  of Economic  Growth  Jean-Paul  Azam  June  1988  E. Zamora
Patrick  Guillaumont  33706
Sylviane  Guillaumont
WPS23  Cost-Effective  Integration  of
Immunization  and  Basic  Health  Services
in  Developing  Countries: The  Problem
of Joint  Costs  A.  Mead  Over,  Jr.  July  1988  N. Jose
33688
WPS24  World  Bank Investments  in  Vocational
Education  and  Training  John  Middleton  July  1988  W.  Ketema
Terri  Demsky  33651
WPS25  Israel's  Vocational  Training  Adrian  Ziderman  July  1988  W.  Ketema
33651
WPS26  Changing  Patterns  in  Vocational
Education  John  Middleton  July  1988  W.  Ketema
33651
WPS27  Family  Background  and  Student
Achievement  Marlaine  E. Lockheed  July  1988  R.  Rinaldi
Bruce  Fuller  _3278
Ronald  Nyirongo
WPS28  Temporary  Windfalls  and  Compensation
Arrangements  Bela  Balassa  June  1988  N.  Campbell
33769
WPS29  The  Relative  Effectiveness  of
Single-Sex  and  Coeducational  Schools
in  Thailand  Emmanuel  Jimenez  August  1988  T.  Hawkins
Marlaine  E. Lockheed  33678
WPS30  The Adding  Up  Problem  Bela  Balassa  July  1988  N.  Campbell
33769
WPS31  Public  Finance  and  Economic  Development  Bela  Balassa  August  1988  N.  Campbell
33769
WPS32  Municipal  Development  Funds  and
Intermediaries  Kenneth  Davey  July  1988  R.  Blade-Chares
33754
WPS33  Fiscal  Policy  in  Commodity-
Exporting  LDCs  John  Cuddington  July  1988  R.  Blade-Chares
33754PPR  Working  Paper  Series
Title  Author  Date  Contact
WPS34  Fiscal  Issues  in  Macroeconomic
Stabilization  Lance  Taylor  September  1988  R. Blade-Charest
33754
WPS35  Improving  the  Allocation  and  Manage-
ment  of Public  Spending  Stephen  Lister  August  1988  R.  Blade-Charest
33754
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33754
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33754
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33754
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